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THE COMPARABLE PROPERTIES STANDARD:
A WINDFALL FOR THE WEALTHY,
A SHORTFALL FOR THE POOR
Timothy R. MacGorman†
ABSTRACT
The Texas Constitution mandates that taxation shall be equal and uniform,
and that property shall be appraised at market value for the purposes of ad
valorem property taxation. While valuation methodology is crucial to property
owners in such a context, the “Comparable Properties Standard” embodied in
Sections 41.43(b)(3) and 42.26(a)(3) of the Texas Tax Code appears to allow
wealthy property owners to unconstitutionally manipulate the appraised value
of their property for ad valorem taxation purposes and shift their tax burden
to other taxpayers. Unless the Texas legislature enacts a mandatory sales price
disclosure statute, or directly amends or repeals the Comparable Properties
Standard, such unconstitutional results will continue to diminish revenues for
taxing units and shift the tax burden from the wealthy to Texas’ lower and
middle-class taxpayers.
While scholars and practitioners have previously expressed the need for a
Texas mandatory sales price disclosure statute in order to reduce inequity in
other valuation contexts, City of Austin v. Travis Central Appraisal District
(“City of Austin”) highlights the longstanding complaint that the Comparable
Properties Standard, absent mandatory sales price disclosure, has distorted the
appraisal process for ad valorem taxation purposes. With millions of dollars
of tax revenue at stake, and a continuing shift of the tax burden from the
wealthy to other Texans, the Comparable Properties Standard presents serious
concerns that may ultimately affect Texans for years to come. Through the
framework of City of Austin, this Article analyzes Texas’ difficulties in imple-
menting an equal and uniform system of ad valorem taxation throughout the
state, exposing the ways in which wealthy residential and commercial property
owners exploit the Comparable Properties Standard in order to reduce their
tax burden, and highlighting the necessity of mandatory sales price disclosure
to ensure constitutionality in the ad valorem taxation process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The requirement that property be evaluated at its fair market value
is virtually uniform across all United States jurisdictions for, inter alia,
condemnation proceedings, ad valorem and estate taxation, and mari-
tal property disputes.1 Valuation methodology is crucial to property
owners in such contexts because the method used to determine value
can result in substantial wealth transfers between parties.2
Appraisers, courts, practitioners, and scholars often disagree about
which methods to utilize and which presumptions to make when de-
termining fair market value.3 In many different legal contexts, deter-
mining market value is controversial or at least highly contested.4 It is
accepted in many areas of law that assets sold at a forced sale will
usually sell for significantly less than their fair market value.5 The fair
market valuation dilemma exerts a destabilizing effect on proceedings
in, inter alia, tax law, bankruptcy law, and business organizations and
partnership law.6 This has led to widespread concern that, even in pro-
ceedings where such valuation is of paramount importance to litigants,
courts may have a difficult time determining fair market value with
accuracy.7 More concerning is that these discrepancies in value often
work in favor of wealthy property owners and at the expense of less
affluent property owners.8
1. See Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, Forced Sale
Risk: Class, Race, and the “Double Discount,” 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 596 (2010).
2. Id. at 620.
3. See, e.g., Advanced Commc’n Design, Inc. v. Follett, 615 N.W.2d 285, 293
(Minn. 2000).
4. Id.
5. Hickey v. United States, 208 F.2d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 1953) (citations omitted);
see also BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994) (stating that market
value in the context of forced sales “is the very antithesis of forced-sale value.”).
6. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 599.
7. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation
for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 687–704 (2005) (noting variations in
compensation in takings cases associated with choice of valuation methodology).
8. See Alex E. Sadler, Note, The Inherent Ambiguity of Commercial Real Estate
Values, 13 VA. TAX REV. 787, 808 (1994) (noting that in disputes between the I.R.S.
and taxpayers, courts sometimes rely on one party’s appraisal based on the strength of
that party’s expert appraiser analysis or the weakness of the opposing expert ap-
praiser’s analysis).
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As fair market value can be difficult to estimate, litigants often ex-
pend substantial amounts of money in proceedings dependent on the
competing opinions of highly compensated appraisal experts.9 Prop-
erty owners unable to marshal the resources to hire such experts find
themselves at a considerable disadvantage.10 This phenomenon has
led many to speculate that proceedings involving such valuation dis-
putes may contribute to a growing gap in wealth between low- to mid-
dle-class people and the upper class.11
Moreover, many speculate that courts and administrators carry out
informal cost-benefit analyses concerning the litigation ability of the
parties involved in such proceedings, unwittingly or not.12 Naturally,
the wealthy wield considerably greater litigation capacity than the less
affluent, which leads to an inference that courts and administrators
may simply be eager to avoid the time and expense of adjudicating
claims featuring the mobilization of such legal prowess. Less affluent
property owners, on the other hand, often lack the resources and so-
phistication to sustain protracted litigation. As a result, the tendency
of courts and administrators is often to overvalue the property of the
wealthy, and to undervalue the property of less affluent property own-
ers.13 From the perspective of courts and administrators, this may sim-
ply be the most efficient means of suppressing protracted litigation.
From the perspective of the property owners, however, the practical
result is a windfall for the wealthy, and a shortfall for everyone else.
This Article addresses a specific subset of this greater valuation
phenomenon: the Texas ad valorem property taxation system.
Through the framework of City of Austin v. Travis Central Appraisal
District,14 this Article analyzes Texas’ difficulties in implementing an
equal and uniform system of ad valorem taxation throughout the
state.
While the disposition of City of Austin may not resolve all of the
issues the case implicates, the constitutionality of section 41.43(b)(3)
and section 42.26(a)(3) of the Texas Property Tax Code (“Tax Code”)
has been called into question in court, and the case accurately frames
a grievance shared by many Texas taxpayers, taxing units, and ap-
praisal districts. With millions of dollars of property taxes at stake and
a continuing shift of the tax burden from wealthy property owners to
low and middle-class property owners, City of Austin presents unique
and serious concerns that may ultimately affect Texans for years to
come.
9. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 599.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Sadler, supra note 8, at 808.
13. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 594.
14. See City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 613–14
(Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.).
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II. AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXES AND THE
TEXAS STATE CONSTITUTION
Texas lacks a state income tax and caps local sales tax at 8.25%.15
As such, Texas is heavily dependent on locally levied and collected ad
valorem property taxes to fund fire and police departments, infra-
structure construction and maintenance, school districts, municipali-
ties, counties, and other political subdivisions of the state.16
Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Texas provides that
“[t]axation shall be equal and uniform,” and that “[a]ll real property
. . . shall be taxed in proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained
as may be provided by law.”17 The Constitution prescribes the end
while leaving the determination of means to the Legislature. The Su-
preme Court of Texas has held that value in the context of article VIII
is “to be based on the reasonable market value of the property.”18 In
Texas, market value is defined as “the price which the property would
bring when it is offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obliged
to sell, and is bought by one who is under no necessity of buying it.”19
Taxing units calculate ad valorem taxes at a certain rate based on
the value of subject properties.20 Thus, the total amount of ad valorem
taxes due for a given property is dependent on the appraised value of
the property.21 In Texas, appraisal districts and Appraisal Review
Boards determine appraised value for ad valorem taxation purposes.22
The power of taxing units to tax property derives solely from the
authority delegated to them by the Legislature.23 Taxing units have no
common law right to levy and collect taxes, and thus no common law
remedy for an alleged loss of tax revenue.24 The only remedies availa-
ble to taxing units in such cases are those embodied in the Tax Code,
and courts are bound to decide such cases in the manner provided by
statute.25
The Texas Constitution provides for no state ad valorem property
taxes.26 Instead, Texas instituted a county-based system for levying
15. Nathan Morey, Unequal and Unfair: Why Texas Should Require Mandatory
Sales Price Disclosure to Reconcile the Texas Property Tax Code with the Texas Con-
stitution, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 553, 592 (2010).
16. Id.
17. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (a)–(b).
18. Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Tex. 1996) (cit-
ing Whelan v. State, 282 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. 1955)).
19. State v. Carpenter, 89 S.W.2d 194, 202 (Tex. 1936).
20. Jim Wells Cty. v. El Paso Prod. Oil & Gas Co., 189 S.W.3d 861, 870 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citations omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a).
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and collecting ad valorem property taxes,27 and a county-based system
for the appraisal of real property for ad valorem tax purposes.28
The adoption of Texas’ current statutory ad valorem taxation
scheme stemmed from discontent with, and consistent efforts to di-
minish, Texas property taxes.29 Prior to the adoption of the Tax Code
in 1979, taxing units determined the value of property for taxing pur-
poses.30 Taxing units maintained their own tax rolls and arbitrated dis-
putes of appraised value.31 In these arbitrated disputes, taxpayers
were required to show substantial injury in order to prevail in chal-
lenges to property valuation.32
The Tax Code instituted appraisal districts for every county in
Texas, effectively severing the functions of the valuation of property
for ad valorem taxation purposes and the arbitration of valuation dis-
putes from taxing units.33 Pursuant to the Tax Code, appraisal districts
are required to appraise real property “at its market value as of Janu-
ary 1.”34 Property is appraised based on characteristics that affect
market value, and appraisal districts are to consider all evidence spe-
cific to property value when determining market value.35 The Texas
Legislature, however, has declined to require mandatory sales price
disclosure for real property, severely limiting the data available to ap-
praisal districts in the valuation of property.36 Texas is in the minority
of states that levy ad valorem taxes but do not require mandatory
sales price disclosure to appraisal or tax authorities.37
At first glance, equal and uniform taxation in proportion to market
value might seem an unsophisticated mandate. However, drafting a
statutory taxing scheme that allows for the accurate determination of
market value, absent mandatory sales price disclosure, has proved to
be a convoluted task.
III. THE TAX CODE
The Supreme Court of Texas mandated uniform ad valorem tax
rates for all types of property and has held that “value” in the context
of section 1 of article VIII of the Texas Constitution is “to be based on
27. Id.
28. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 6.01–6.43 (West 2015 & Supp. 2016).
29. See Brief of Appellee, City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506
S.W.3d 607 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.) (No. 03-16-00038-CV), 2016 WL
3438258, at *2-3.
30. Morey, supra note 15, at 569–71.
31. Id. at 569–70.
32. Id. at 570–71.
33. Id. at 571–73.
34. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.01(a) (West Supp. 2016).
35. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.01(b) (West Supp. 2016).
36. Morey, supra note 15, at 583–84.
37. Id.
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the reasonable market value of the property.”38 Taxation is not in the
same proportion to the value of the subject property unless the values
are calculated by the same standard.39 Nonetheless, the Court does
not demand precise exactitude from the appraisal and taxation pro-
cess and recognizes that exact uniformity and equality is unfeasible.40
Reasonable discrepancies between the market value of property and
the value at which property is assessed for taxes are permissible to
allow for a difference in judgment.41 However, too great a discrepancy
goes beyond a mere difference in judgment, and provides fertile
ground for judicial scrutiny.42
While a reasonable discrepancy between actual value and the value
assessed for taxes is permissible in Texas, some critics assert that sec-
tion 41.43(b)(3) and section 42.26(a)(3) of the Tax Code—collectively,
“comparable properties standard”—practically “allow some property
values to be reduced to the median value of selected comparable
properties, while other properties remain at the constitutionally-man-
dated market value.”43 The comparable properties standard appears
to allow some taxpayers—particularly owners of upper class residen-
tial or commercial property—to manipulate the appraised value of
their property for ad valorem taxation purposes, and shift their tax
burden to other taxpayers.44
The current Tax Code appears to be inconsistent with the axiomatic
principle that “[t]he Legislature may not authorize that which the
Constitution prohibits.”45 The Tax Code appears facially constitu-
tional, but the results produced by the comparable properties stan-
dard appear to be at odds with the dual constitutional mandates of
equal and uniform taxation in proportion to market value.46
IV. THE COMPARABLE PROPERTIES STANDARD
The comparable properties standard was enacted as part of Senate
Bill 841, the so-called “Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights.”47 While there is lit-
tle or no specific legislative history shedding light on the purpose of
38. Enron Corp. v. Spring I.S.D., 922 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Tex. 1996) (citing Whelan
v. State, 282 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. 1955)).
39. Id. (citing Lively v. Mo., K & T Ry. Co., 120 S.W. 852, 856 (Tex. 1909)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Brief of Appellant, City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d
607 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet. h.) (No. 03-16-00038-CV), 2016 WL 1587525, at
*39.
44. Id.; see also, Joel Nihlean, Appraisal Woes, COUNTY MAG. (Mar. 28, 2016),
http://www.county.org/magazine/features/Pages/2016%20March/Appraisal-Woes
.aspx.
45. Morey, supra note 15, at 578 (citations omitted).
46. See generally Morey, supra note 15.
47. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. United Inv’rs Realty Tr., 47 S.W.3d 648, 652
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
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the comparable properties standard, one Texas Court of Appeals
found that the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights is intended to facilitate tax
remedies for Texas property owners and should be given a liberal
construction.48
Prior to the enactment of the comparable properties standard, tax-
payers were required to acquire an independent appraisal of the mar-
ket value of a sample of similar properties in order to prevail in an
unequal tax valuation challenge in district court.49 As it currently
stands, the comparable properties standard allows property owners to
protest the appraisal district’s determinations of value without proof
of, or even regard for, the actual fair market value of the subject prop-
erty and comparable properties.50
To challenge the appraisal district’s alleged unequal appraisal of a
property, the property owner must identify a group of comparable
properties.51 Commonly, a selection of five to ten comparable proper-
ties is considered an appropriate number for the purposes of such
challenges, although more or less comparable properties are some-
times necessary depending on the subject property and the facts of the
challenge.52
Once an appropriate list of comparable properties has been se-
lected, it is appropriately adjusted to the subject property, allowing for
such variables as, inter alia, square footage of the parcels, cubic foot-
age of improvements, and depreciation.53 The taxpayers may adjust
the comparable properties themselves, normally by means of an inde-
pendent expert, or may simply allow the appraisal district or appraisal
review board to adjust the comparable properties.54
Once a reasonable number of comparable properties have been
identified and appropriately adjusted, the median appraised value of
the adjusted comparable properties is calculated.55 If the appraised
value of the subject property is greater than this median, the review-
ing appraisal review board or court should grant relief on the basis
that the property was appraised unequally.56 At no point during this
inquiry must the actual fair market value of the subject property or
comparable properties be calculated.57 Instead, as one court of ap-
48. Id.
49. Id. at 653.
50. Id.
51. Patrick C. O’Connor, Using Assessment Comparables to Fight Unequal Prop-
erty Taxes, O’Connor & Associates (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.poconnor
.com/article.asp?id=34.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.26(a)(3) (West 2015).
56. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.26 (West 2015).
57. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. United Inv’rs Realty Tr., 47 S.W.3d 648, 653
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
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peals has held, the appraisal district’s appraised value is presumed to
represent market value.58
V. CITY OF AUSTIN V. TRAVIS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT
In City of Austin, a major taxing unit called into question the effi-
cacy of the statutory taxation and valuation scheme embodied in the
Tax Code. The crux of the case was the City of Austin’s (“City”) alle-
gation that the Travis Central Appraisal District (“TCAD”) underval-
ued the C1 (vacant land) and F1 (commercial real property)
categories of real property for the 2015 appraisal roll.59 The case “was
born out of a longstanding complaint heard around the state that the
appraisal process has become distorted, with the values of large com-
mercial properties being disconnected from their actual market value.
The rub in this . . . the tax burden these properties alleviate them-
selves of is shifted to Texas’ small business owners and
homeowners.”60
While Texas courts adjudicate hundreds of property valuation chal-
lenges brought by individual taxpayers each year, valuation challenges
of an entire category of property brought by taxing units inhabit a
relatively undeveloped area of law.61 More importantly, City of Austin
presents a broad challenge to the constitutionality of the comparable
properties standard, highlighting serious implications for both taxing
units and taxpayers.
District Judge Tim Sulak dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the City
lacked standing to challenge the appraisal district’s valuations.62 How-
ever, Judge Sulak foresaw an appeal, and intended to “tee up” the
lawsuit for the Court of Appeals.63
A. The Trial Court’s Disposition
The City of Austin brought claims against the TCAD under the Tax
Code and the Texas Constitution.64 The City sought review of the de-
cision of the appraisal review board denying the City’s challenge to
the level of appraisals for C1 (vacant land) and F1 (commercial real
property) categories for the 2015 tax roll.65 Additionally, the City
sought a declaration that the comparable properties standard of the
58. Id. at 654.
59. See generally, Brief of Appellant, supra note 43.
60. Nihlean, supra note 44.
61. Brief of Appellant, supra note 43, at *2.
62. Id.
63. Michael King, TCAD Lawsuit Dismissed: Onward and Upward?, THE AUSTIN
CHRONICLE (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2015-11-13/tcad-
lawsuit-dismissed-onward-and-upward/.
64. Brief of Appellant, supra note 43, at *1.
65. Id.
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Tax Code is in violation of the dual constitutional mandates of equal
and uniform taxation and appraisal at market value.66
The City sought an order that individual C1 and F1 property owners
were not necessary or proper parties to the suit because they lacked a
justiciable interest in the City’s challenge.67 The City asserted that its
challenge did not concern the valuation of any individual property68
because the City challenged the level of appraisals for entire catego-
ries of property, and not specific properties.69 The City averred that
because no individual owns an entire category of property across
Travis County, and because individual owners have their own remedy
for challenging the appraisal of their property if there is a change in
appraised value, individual owners were not necessary parties to the
suit.70 The City also claimed that allowing individual property owners
to be parties to the suit would render an absurd result, requiring the
participation of tens of thousands of taxpayers in the lawsuit.71 The
trial court denied the City’s motion.72
The trial court allowed multiple property owners to appear and file
dispositive motions.73 The court granted one motion without specify-
ing its reasons.74 That motion alleged that: (1) the City failed to ex-
haust administrative remedies; (2) the City lacked standing to sue; (3)
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (4) the City failed to join
necessary parties; and (5) the Tax Code provisions at issue were con-
stitutional as a matter of law.75 The court then granted another mo-
tion, which alleged that the City lacked standing to challenge the
comparable properties standard embodied in the Tax Code.76 The two
motions decided most of the City’s claims.77
The City moved for a new trial, but the trial court declined to rule
on the motion.78 The City then filed a notice of appeal, requesting
review of the dispositive motions and the order denying the City’s re-
quest for party determination.79
B. The City’s Appeal
The City’s appeal concerned the foundations of the Tax Code, and
questioned the Legislature’s allocation of power between taxing units
66. Id.
67. Id. at *1–2.
68. Id. at *8.
69. Id. at *9.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *2.
73. Id. at *6.
74. Id. at *7.
75. Id. at *6–7.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *7.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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and appraisal districts.80 On appeal, the City claimed that the trial
court’s orders left taxing units with “no meaningful opportunity to
challenge whether a chief appraiser has properly determined the level
of appraisals for a category of property.”81 The City asserted that, pur-
suant to the Tax Code, taxing units are unable to pursue important
valuation challenges against appraisal districts, upsetting the balance
of power allocated between taxing units and appraisal districts by the
Legislature.82 Under the Tax Code, the City argued, appraisal districts
are left unanswerable for the alleged underappraisals, and taxing units
are left without remedy, contravening the will of the Legislature.83
TCAD has not avoided the issue entirely by challenging the City’s
standing to bring this action. TCAD pursued the obvious jurisdic-
tional challenge to such allegations, but in its reply brief acknowl-
edged that the City’s goal in the litigation was to improve the Texas
property tax system.84 TCAD maintained that the district’s Chief Ap-
praiser supported legislative change to improve the tax system.85
However, TCAD asserted that the City’s grievance against the ap-
praisal district was misdirected and, as a matter of law, the City was
not entitled to relief.86 TCAD’s jurisdictional challenge undoubtedly
has merit, but its response to the City’s lawsuit nonetheless under-
scores an uneasiness with the appraisal process, an uneasiness shared
by many Texas taxing units and appraisal districts.
C. The Court of Appeals’ Disposition
A court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction if the plaintiff lacks stand-
ing to assert the claim.87 In City of Austin, the City sought to address
the issue of standing by asserting that its purpose in bringing the law-
suit was not to raise additional tax revenue, but instead to ensure con-
stitutionally equal and uniform taxation to its residents.88 The City
asserted direct injury, which it claimed was sufficient to confer stand-
ing.89 The City’s theory was that the Tax Code gave it no choice but to
levy taxes in an unconstitutional manner.90
Generally, a taxing unit has standing to bring a constitutional chal-
lenge if it has been charged with implementing the allegedly unconsti-
80. Id. at *36.
81. Id. at *8.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *36.
84. Brief of Appellee, City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d
607 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.) (No. 03-16-00038-CV), 2016 WL 3427157, at *5.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012).
88. Brief of Appellant, supra note 43, at *32.
89. Id. at *35.
90. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-4\TWR405.txt unknown Seq: 11 19-JAN-18 12:49
2018] THE COMPARABLE PROPERTIES STANDARD 371
tutional statute.91 However, as the Court of Appeals held in City of
Austin, the comparable properties standard concerns the appraisal
process, and does not involve any method or mechanism by which tax-
ing units levy or collect ad valorem taxes.92 The Court of Appeals held
that the City was not charged with implementing the provisions at is-
sue and, thus, the City did not demonstrate an injury conferring stand-
ing to challenge the comparable properties standard of the Tax
Code.93 The fact that the City might be “forced to impose [unconstitu-
tional] taxes” did not demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury
to the City, as opposed to the City’s ad valorem property taxpayers.94
Beyond the issue of standing, the Court of Appeals found that the
City had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking
judicial review.95 The Tax Code vests appraisal review boards with the
exclusive jurisdiction to decide protests and challenges to appraised
property values.96 A taxing unit has a statutory right to challenge cer-
tain actions of the appraisal district before the local appraisal review
board, and, where they have standing, to seek judicial review of the
appraisal review board’s determination of the challenge.97 Nonethe-
less, taxing units must fully exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking judicial review.98
While the City’s representatives attended the appraisal review
board’s hearing of the City’s challenge petition, the City failed to pre-
sent evidence or argument in support of its petition and, thus, did not
present the merits of its challenge.99 Instead, attorneys of the City and
the Appraisal District encouraged the appraisal review board to deny
the City’s challenge petition in order to enable TCAD to certify the
tax rolls, and to allow the parties to proceed in district court.100 Thus,
the City appeared for the sole purpose of requesting that the appraisal
review board reject its challenge petition.101
Such a result deprived the appraisal review board of reaching the
merits of the City’s challenge petition.102 The City’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies proved fatal to the district court’s jurisdiction
over the challenge to the level of appraisals of C1 and F1 property for
the 2015 tax year.103 However, exhausting administrative remedies
91. City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 616 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2016, no pet.).
92. Id. at 616–17.
93. Id. at 617.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 619.
96. Id. at 617.
97. Id. at 618.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 619.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 620 n.7.
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would not confer the requisite standing for a constitutional challenge.
The district court would have jurisdiction only to review the appraisal
review board’s decision regarding, specifically, the appraised value of
C1 and F1 property for the 2015 tax year.
The Court of Appeals found that the City’s constitutional challenge
was “a transparent attempt by a taxing unit to debate an issue of tax
policy that is within the prerogative of the Legislature, rather than the
Judiciary.”104 The judiciary probably will not address the constitution-
ality of the comparable properties standard. As it is likely that neither
taxing units nor the taxpayers damaged by the inequity in tax burden
will be able to show the concrete, particularized injury necessary to
confer standing, courts will likely continue to avoid the constitutional
question. Ultimately, if the issue is to be resolved, it is likely the pre-
rogative of the Texas Legislature to act.
The use of two separate values for determining appraisals pursuant
to the comparable properties standard, according to the City’s theory,
is plainly in violation of the Texas Constitution’s dual mandates of
equality and uniformity in taxation and appraisal at market value.105
While the constitutionality of the comparable properties standard has
not been fully addressed by Texas courts, one court of appeals has
held that “[i]t is unfair, and constitutionally prohibited, to require one
taxpayer to pay a tax based on market values if other taxpayers are
paying a rate that is lower than the market value of their proper-
ties.”106 Somewhat surprisingly, the same court decided that conflicts
between taxation at market value and equal and uniform taxation are
to be resolved in favor of equal and uniform taxation—apparently re-
gardless of the Constitution’s mandate of appraisal at market value.107
Moreover, as City of Austin makes clear, taxing units lack standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the comparable properties standard.
Implementation of the comparable properties standard is within the
purview of Texas appraisal districts.
VI. APPRAISAL DISTRICTS AND ACCEPTED
APPRAISAL METHODOLOGY
Appraisal districts are political subdivisions of the state.108 A board
of directors, selected by the taxing units of the district, governs each
appraisal district.109 The board of directors appoints the chief ap-
104. Id. at 620.
105. Brief of Appellant, supra note 43, at *39.
106. Id. (quoting Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. United Inv’rs Realty Tr., 47 S.W.3d
648 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)).
107. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. United Inv’rs Realty Tr., 47 S.W.3d 648, 654
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
108. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.01 (West 2015).
109. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (West 2015).
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praiser of the district.110 In some counties, the board of directors also
appoints members of the appraisal review board.111 In counties with a
population of 120,000 or more, the members of the appraisal review
board are appointed by the local administrative district judge of the
county in which the appraisal district is established pursuant to Sub-
chapter D, Chapter 74, Government Code.112 The chief appraiser sets
the preliminary valuation of taxable property,113 while appraisal re-
view boards hear and adjudicate disputes by taxpayers and taxing
units.114
In the absence of mandatory sales price disclosure, the Legislature
has failed to give much guidance to appraisal districts as to how to
value properties according to market value. The Tax Code provides
simply that appraisal districts must value properties as “determined by
the application of generally accepted appraisal methods and
techniques.”115
Appraisal districts are to consider and select the most appropriate
method between the cost, income, and market data comparison meth-
ods of appraisal.116 Such instruction, at least as to the market data
comparison method, acknowledges that sales price is one of the most
accepted indicators of the fair market value of property. However, as
sales data for many properties is unavailable due to the lack of
mandatory sales price disclosure, appraisal districts must often rely on
the cost and income methods of appraisal.
A. The Cost Method
According to the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, the cost
method of appraisal is particularly useful in the appraisal of properties
for which there is an absence of sales and income data.117 The cost
method of appraisal is based on estimates from “generally accepted
sources” of what it would cost to replace a building with “one of equal
utility.”118 Chief appraisers are to make appropriate adjustments for
obsolescence and depreciation in applying the cost method.119
110. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.05(c) (West 2015).
111. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.41(d) (West Supp. 2016).
112. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.41(d-1) (West Supp. 2016).
113. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.01(a) (West 2015).
114. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.01(a) (West 2015).
115. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.01(b) (West 2015).
116. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.0101 (West 2015).
117. Glenn Hegar, Property Tax Basics, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB.ACCTS. 5
(June 2016), https://search.comptroller.texas.gov/search?site=ctg_collection&client=
ctg_frontend&proxystylesheet=ctg_frontend&output=xml_no_dtd&getfields=descrip
tion&searchDropdown=ctg_collection&q=property+tax+basics (download third
PDF).
118. Id.
119. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-4\TWR405.txt unknown Seq: 14 19-JAN-18 12:49
374 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 4
The theory behind the cost method of appraisal is the principle of
substitution.120 The assumption is that purchasers would not pay more
for a property than the cost of replacing the property.121 Pursuant to
the cost method of appraisal, market value may be determined by ad-
ding the market value of the land, as if it were vacant, to the cost of
structural improvements, allowing for the accumulated depreciation
of the improvements.122
Theoretically, this may seem a sound approach to determining mar-
ket value. However, there is danger in equating cost and value. Corre-
spondence between market value and cost cannot be guaranteed
unless the property improvements are new and make the highest and
best use of the site, concurrently with the market nearing or reaching
a point of long-term equilibrium.123
Cost presents difficulties, as it is an amalgam of various elements
that are not readily identifiable to appraisers.124 Moreover, appraisal
experts have yet to engineer a satisfactory method of measuring de-
preciation.125 These difficulties stem from the same root cause, that
“market transactions which provide the only reliable evidence of mar-
ket value cannot be analyzed using the cost method.”126 (Emphasis
added). Thus, the cost method fails to take into account the way in
which buyers and sellers determine their asking and bid prices.127 The
cost approach to appraisal is certainly useful in some contexts, but
falls short of providing a meaningful solution to the discrepancies in
the appraisals of upper-class and commercial properties in comparison
to low- or middle-class owned properties pursuant to the comparable
properties standard.
B. The Income Method
The income method of appraisal centers on income and expense
data and attempts to determine what investors would pay now for po-
tential revenue generated by the property.128 The income method is
best suited to properties purchased for the purpose of the production
of income, such as office buildings or residential rental properties.129
Chief appraisers approximate, on reasonably clear and appropriate
evidence, the gross income potential and operating expenses, the capi-
120. Stanley Hamilton, Real Estate Investment Analysis and Appraisal, VANCOU-
VER: UBC REAL ESTATE DIV. (1998), https://professional.sauder.ubc.ca/re_creditpro
gram/course_resources/courses/content/330/REIAACH7.htm#N_1_.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Hegar, supra note 117, at 5.
129. Id.
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talization rates or rates of discount, and projections of future income
and expenses for the subject property.130
Like the cost method of appraisal, the income method is not with-
out flaws as a method of determining market value. Operational
problems may raise or depress net income.131 Rents may be unreason-
ably high or low, yielding an unrealistic expectation of future rent
under competent management.132 Tenants may not be paying their
rent, severely depressing income.133 Expenses may be much higher or
lower than they ideally should be, skewing estimates of profitabil-
ity.134 Such variables have little or nothing to do with the actual mar-
ket value of the property, but instead ebb and flow with the efficacy of
the property’s management. Still, these variables exhibit a significant
fluctuating effect on the valuation of property when utilizing the in-
come method of appraisal.135 Such variables render the income
method suspect as a consistent and reliable method of determining the
fair market value of property. Moreover, the utility of the income
method of appraisal is to income-producing properties. Thus, the in-
come method of appraisal does little to relieve appraisal districts of
their difficulties in determining fair market value, especially as it per-
tains to residential property valuation challenges pursuant to the com-
parable properties standard.
C. The Market Data Comparison Method
In the absence of mandatory sales price disclosure, appraisal dis-
tricts are statutorily bound to determine the market value of proper-
ties as of the first of January each year, yet inadequately equipped as
to the methodology by which to do so.136
The character of the Texas real estate market is such that the sales
data of some types of property are more readily available than the
sales data of other types of property.137 While Texas lacks a
mandatory sales price disclosure statute, owners of low- and middle-
class residential properties are more likely than owners of commercial
or upper-class residential properties to have the sales price of their
properties listed in a Multiple Listing Service (MLS), a privately
owned database commonly used by real estate brokers, private ap-
praisers, and appraisal districts for the valuation of properties.138 The
130. Id.
131. See generally James Kimmons, The Income Method of Real Estate Appraisal
and Valuation, BALANCE (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.thebalance.com/the-income-
method-of-real-estate-appraisal-and-valuation-2866419.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Morey, supra note 15, at 576–77.
137. Id. at 567.
138. Id. at 568–69.
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availability of such data diminishes the ability of middle-class residen-
tial property owners to successfully challenge the valuation of their
property, as many appraisal districts present MLS data as evidence
upon review.139 The growing void of MLS data on upper-class residen-
tial properties appears to coincide with the recent rise in instances of
so-called “off-market” real estate transactions, in which sellers decline
to list property on such databases, opting for other means of finding a
buyer.140 Thus, sophisticated and affluent property owners are able to
shift their tax burden to low- and middle-class property owners by
utilizing the void of sales data to reduce the appraised value of their
property. Moreover, the lack of MLS sales data on many commercial
properties often induces appraisal districts to utilize the income
method of appraisal for such properties, with all of the inaccuracies of
that method of appraisal described above.
Lower- and middle-class residential property owners have little
hope in challenging the valuations of their properties, as appraisal dis-
tricts can simply point to MLS listings of the subject property or com-
parable properties. This is not to say that this is an inequitable result
in every such low- or middle-class residential valuation challenge. Ar-
guably, the data available for comparable properties in the MLS list-
ings make appraisal district valuations of such properties both more
accurate and easier to determine. However, the MLS listings enable
appraisal districts to accurately value a disproportionately high num-
ber of low- and middle-class properties in comparison to commercial
and upper-class residential properties.141 Wealthy property owners are
free to levy their considerable resources in attempts to reduce the ap-
praised value of their properties for ad valorem taxation purposes, in
the void of MLS sales data on such properties.142 For wealthy property
owners, there is significant room to argue which properties are compa-
rable, and what the appropriately adjusted median appraised value of
those properties actually is.143
VII. MANDATORY SALES PRICE DISCLOSURE
While the comparable properties standard presents difficulties for
equality and uniformity in proportion to market value, the underlying
solution to the valuation problem may be simple. The comparable
properties standard is only relevant if the taxpayer protests the ap-
praisal of their property as unequal for ad valorem taxation pur-
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Morgan Brennan, Stealth ‘Off-Market’ Home Sales On The Rise
Among The Super-Wealthy, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
morganbrennan/2013/02/15/stealth-home-sales-on-the-rise-among-the-super-wealthy/
#2b2b90e9225f.
141. Morey, supra note 15, at 592.
142. Id. at 567–69.
143. Id.
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poses.144 Taxpayer valuation challenges pursuant to the comparable
properties standard operate under the assumption that the appraisal
district’s valuation is unequal to the median appraisal of comparable
properties appropriately adjusted.145 Appraisal districts can more ac-
curately value property with mandatory sales price disclosure. With
such a tool, the ability of commercial and upper-class residential prop-
erty owners to lower the appraised value of their property through
appraisal review boards and courts diminishes. Thus, the subsequent
shifting of tax burden to low- and middle-class property owners is
reduced.146
While the sales price of property may not always reflect its fair mar-
ket value, sales price nonetheless remains among the appraiser’s best
tools.147 Opponents to mandatory sales price disclosure frequently
emphasize the disparity between sales price and market value, yet ap-
praisal districts and private appraisers frequently utilize sales price
data to determine market value in their appraisals, when such data is
available.148
In Texas, purchase price is probative evidence of market value.149
Both appraisal review boards and reviewing district courts take sales
price as evidence of market value in valuation challenges.150 Nonethe-
less, the Legislature has declined to compel the mandatory sales price
disclosure of real property to taxing and appraisal authorities.151
The frequently articulated reasoning behind the Legislature’s rejec-
tion of mandatory sales price disclosure is to protect the privacy of
parties to real property transactions.152 The reasoning is clear enough:
buyers and sellers of real property may have a substantial interest in
avoiding the public disclosure of the amount of wealth exchanged in
return for a parcel of property.
Wealthy real estate investors are, understandably, reluctant to em-
brace transparency in their transactions. The price paid for a parcel
might be well above or below fair market value, for reasons not read-
ily apparent to a disinterested observer. Sales price disclosure might
yield revelations concerning the economic positions of the parties,
prompting third parties to draw undesirable conclusions. The fallout
of mandatory sales price disclosure might harm the posturing of par-
ties to real estate transactions, adversely affecting future negotiations.
Mandatory sales price disclosure could potentially subject the parties
of real estate transactions to unfavorable press. For these reasons and
144. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.43(b) (West 2015).
145. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.43(b)(3) (West 2015).
146. See generally Morey, supra note 15.
147. Id. at 566.
148. Id. at 587.
149. Id. at 566.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 583.
152. Id. at 588.
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more, many argue that mandatory sales price disclosure would sup-
press the State’s interest in promoting the alienability of real property.
The City in City of Austin, however, originally requested that, inter
alia, the court declare that mandatory sales price disclosure is essential
in order for appraisal districts to fulfill their duties, although the City
later dropped this request.153
While the privacy anxieties of parties to such transactions may be
understandable, such concerns are unconvincing in the context of
Texas real property transactions. Texas county tax offices are required
to disclose to the public the appraised value of property in their juris-
diction. Anyone may retrieve the appraised value of virtually any
property in Texas. As tax offices and appraisal districts provide easy
access to such information, protecting privacy is not at issue.
VIII. THE COMPARABLE PROPERTIES STANDARD IN PRACTICE
To further illustrate how mandatory sales price disclosure might al-
leviate Texas of many of its appraisal issues, it is necessary to explore
the workings of the comparable properties standard, in practice. Con-
sider Harris County Appraisal District v. United Investors Realty
Trust.154
On January 28, 1998, United Investors Realty Trust purchased Ma-
son Park Centre in Houston, Texas, for $15,200,000.155 With 163,278
square feet of rentable area, United Investors paid roughly $93 per
square foot.156 The Harris County Appraisal District listed the ap-
praised value of Mason Park Centre as $13,900,000 for the 1998 tax
year at $85.13 per square foot.157
HCAD likely appraised the Mason Park Centre at significantly be-
low its fair market value. While sales price does not always accurately
reflect fair market value, it is unlikely that sophisticated real estate
investors would voluntarily pay in excess of $1,000,000 of the fair mar-
ket value of a property, barring some extreme extrinsic circumstances.
Nonetheless, United Investors challenged the valuation of its newly
purchased property pursuant to the comparable properties standard,
and sought to decrease the already questionably low appraisal of Ma-
son Park Centre from $13,900,000 to $10,239,163, from $85.13 per
square foot to $62.71 per square foot.158
153. Andra Lim, Austin’s appraisal lawsuit no longer includes sales disclosure re-
quest, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.mystatesman.com/
news/local/austin-appraisal-lawsuit-longer-includes-sales-disclosure-request/aQYvrv9
YcCtNZs6q6Nbi8O/.
154. 47 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
155. Id. at 649.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 650.
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United Investors hired an expert valuation witness, who made no
independent determinations of market value.159 The expert valuation
witness did, however, compare HCAD’s determinations of the market
value of comparable properties.160 HCAD, on the other hand, argued
that United Investors’ (and the district court’s) determination of value
was not based on market value and lacked any relationship to market
value, in contravention to the Texas Constitution’s mandate of valua-
tion at market value.161
The court determined that such remedial statutes are to be liberally
construed so as not to interpret the statute as defeating the purpose
for which it was enacted.162 The court held that the comparable
properties standard requires no independent appraisal of market
value.163 Taxpayers must simply contrast the appraisal district’s ap-
praised value of the subject property with the appraisal district’s ap-
praised value of appropriately adjusted “comparable” properties in
order to show a disparity in “market value.” Thus, the comparable
properties standard, as interpreted by the court of appeals in Harris
County, “facilitates proof of inequity and therefore facilitates tax rem-
edies for property owners.”164
The court in Harris County could not avoid the disturbing conclu-
sion that the comparable properties standard allows property owners
to protest the appraisal district’s and appraisal review board’s deter-
minations of value without proof of or even regard for the actual fair
market value of the subject property and comparable properties.165
Nonetheless, the court found no error in the district court’s finding
that the provision did not violate the Texas Constitution’s requirement
that all property be taxed equally and uniformly in proportion to mar-
ket value.166 Instead, the court held that the Tax Code provides that
the appraisal district’s appraised value is market value, and the record
lacked evidence that the property at issue was not appraised at market
value.167 Consequently, the court simply assumed that the appraisal
district’s appraised value of the comparable properties represented
the properties’ fair market value.168 Even if this were not the case, the
court determined that conflicts between taxation at market value and
equal and uniform taxation are to be resolved in favor of equal and
uniform taxation, at the expense of taxation at market value.169
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 651.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 653.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 654.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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This decision leaves much more to be desired. The comparable
properties standard may have been fairly interpreted by the court in
Harris County as not requiring a determination of market value, but
the Texas Constitution mandates both equal and uniform taxation and
appraisal at market value, not merely one or the other.
IX. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Texas has adopted a two-pronged framework for analyzing the con-
stitutionality of taxation statutes and the tax classifications embodied
therein.170 First, challenged statutes are granted a strong presumption
of constitutionality.171 The presumption of constitutionality is particu-
larly strong when the constitutionality of taxation statutes is chal-
lenged.172 Second, the Legislature must have a rational basis for
creating tax classifications.173 Such tax classifications “must not only
be rational but must attempt to group similar things and differentiate
dissimilar things.”174 Tax classifications must relate reasonably to the
purpose of the tax.175 Crucially, the Legislature has broad discretion in
structuring tax laws, particularly when the object of the tax is not eas-
ily or precisely valued.176
If a court can ascertain a reasonable, constitutional construction
that carries out the Legislature’s intent, the statute is upheld.177 The
presumption of constitutionality persists unless the challenging party
shows the unlawfulness of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt.178
The statute may be invalidated upon a showing of substantial injury to
the challenging party.179
The Legislature may create tax classifications so long as they are not
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.180 However, the Legislature’s
ability to form classifications for ad valorem taxes is considerably
more limited than its ability to form classifications for other types of
taxation, such as occupation, use, and sales taxes.181 While the Texas
Constitution directs that taxes on real property be in proportion to the
market value of the property, it does not prohibit utilizing diverging
methods of determining market value for ad valorem taxation
purposes.182
170. Hegar v. Tex. Small Tobacco Coal., 496 S.W.3d 778, 785 (Tex. 2016).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 610, 622 (Tex. 2012).
175. Id. at 623.
176. Id.
177. 12B TEX. JUR. 3D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 54 (2017).
178. 69 TEX. JUR. 3D TAXATION § 9 (2017).
179. Id.
180. Enron Corp. v. Spring I.S.D., 922 S.W.2d 931, 936 (Tex. 1996).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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The Texas Constitution’s requirements of equality and uniformity
are similar to those embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.183 Decisions concerning the constitution-
ality of tax classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment offer gui-
dance.184 Yet even in cases of great disparities in tax burden, the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment are satisfied as long as the
court can discern policy justifications for the classifications.185 Courts
give even more deference to classifications formed under complex tax
laws.186 Judicial deference to the complex ad valorem taxation scheme
embodied in the Tax Code renders judicial intervention in the compa-
rable properties standard conundrum unlikely, to say the least. As a
result, Texas courts appear to have little interest in, or ability to hear,
the merits of constitutional challenges to the comparable properties
standard.
X. CONCLUSION
Texas has embraced deference for the Legislature’s perceived policy
justifications for tax statutes, and much of Texas’ system of ad valorem
taxation embodies policies favorable toward and protective of taxpay-
ers.187 For example, Section 23.12(f) of the Tax Code allows the tax-
payer to choose between two different appraisal dates for the
valuation of inventory for ad valorem taxes: September 1 of the year
preceding the tax year to which the appraisal applies, or the value as
of January 1 of the tax year to which the appraisal applies.188 It is far
from certain, however, that taxpayers will choose the valuation date
that most closely reflects the fair market value of their property. Natu-
rally, taxpayers will choose the date that grants the lesser of the two
appraisals and reduces their resulting tax burden, despite the conten-
tion that Section 23.12(f) evidences legislative intent to promote ap-
praisals on a value more indicative of true market value.189
Despite policy assertions explaining the Legislature’s adoption of
the comparable properties standard absent mandatory sales price dis-
closure, the current state of the Tax Code and Texas jurisprudence
offers little meaningful ability to challenge the constitutionality of the
comparable properties standard. Taxing units are generally excluded
from the appraisal process.190 Taxing units may challenge certain ac-
tions of the local appraisal district through Chapter 41, subchapter A
of the Tax Code, such as a challenge of the level of appraisals of any
183. Id. at 936–37.
184. Id. at 937.
185. Id. (citation omitted).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 939 (citations omitted).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 610–11 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2016, no pet.).
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category of property in the district.191 Once a taxing unit files a chal-
lenge with the appraisal review board, the appraisal review board
holds a hearing and issues a written order stating its decision.192 In the
case of an adverse decision by the appraisal review board, the taxing
unit may appeal the order to the county’s district court.193 However, a
taxing unit’s challenge is contingent, like all other claims, on sufficient
injury to confer standing, and the court’s willingness to interrupt def-
erence for the legislative taxing scheme in order to hear the merits of
the constitutional challenge.
Taxing units, who feel firsthand the brunt of crippling losses of tax
revenue, lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the compa-
rable properties standard, as City of Austin makes clear. The City
could not “demonstrate an injury that is concrete and particularized to
the City, as opposed to the City’s property owners.”194 It seems un-
likely that other taxing units would be able to show such an injury in
similar cases.
Taxpayers may have more leeway to challenge the constitutionality
of the statute if they have suffered such an injury, yet this proposition
is also dubious. It is unlikely, if not impossible, that a low- or middle-
class taxpayer can show that they have personally suffered concrete
and particularized injury due to the diminished tax burden of other
taxpayers. The shifting tax burden in Texas disperses amongst millions
of low- and middle-class taxpayers. The injury diffuses into a class so
large as to make a showing of individual concrete and particularized
injury unrealistic.
Texas courts have little power to remedy the constitutional
problems raised by the comparable properties standard and the ab-
sence of mandatory sales price disclosure in Texas. Where there is no
standing to assert a constitutional challenge, there is no subject-matter
jurisdiction granting courts the ability to decide the issue on the mer-
its. Even where courts have jurisdiction to hear the challenge, defer-
ence to the Legislature may discourage courts from hearing the merits
of the challenge. The Legislature, however, may amend the compara-
ble properties standard to disallow the unconstitutional results it pro-
duces, or may require the mandatory sales price disclosure necessary
for the comparable properties standard to be implemented constitu-
tionally. Until the Legislature comes to such a decision, Texas low-
and middle-class property owners will continue to bear the ever-grow-
ing tax burden passed onto them by wealthy property owners, and
taxing units will continue to suffer from the devastating loss of reve-
nue attributable to the comparable properties standard of the Tax
Code.
191. Id. at 613–14.
192. Id. at 616–17.
193. Id. at 611.
194. Id. at 617–18.
